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Limits on the State's Power to Confine
"Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional
Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana
James W. Ellis*
On a number of occasions, the United States Supreme
Court has decided cases regarding the state's ability to confine
individuals in circumstances other than criminal convictions.
In these cases, the Court has recognized that states pursue several public policies through non-conviction confinements,
including involuntary treatment of mentally ill individuals,
habilitation of developmentally disabled individuals, determination of competency to stand trial of accused individuals, and
protection of public safety. For the Court, each such system
presents unique issues involving achieving procedural fairness,
achieving a balance between the state's interest in confinement
and the individual's right to liberty, and achieving equal protection among the jurisdiction's various systems of confinement. The Court's cases have not, however, announced
comprehensive constitutional principles addressing these
issues.
In its recent decision in Foucha v. Louisiana,' the Court
again declined to provide a complete set of constitutional
guidelines, but it did give some guidance on the applicability of
procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection principles. It also provided some indication of the
views of the newer members of a changing Court. All of these
concerns are raised by Washington's Sexually Violent
Predators statute, providing for the confinement of individuals
determined to be "sexual predators."
* Henry Weihofen Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The author
served as the Law Reporter for the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice on the commitment of insanity acquittees and filed an amicus curiae
brief with the Supreme Court of the United States in Foucha v. Louisianaon behalf of
the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the National Mental Health Association,
the American Association on Mental Retardation, the National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the ACLU
of Louisiana.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
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This Article does not attempt a complete analysis of all
the constitutional implications of Foucha, nor does it attempt
to provide a definitive answer to the question of the constitutionality of Washington's sexual predator statute. Rather,
because Foucha addressed important due process and equal
protection questions relevant to the Washington statute, the
Article is an attempt to analyze the case's basic constitutional
holdings and discussion on the issue of state deprivation of
physical liberty.
I.

THE FOUCHA LITIGATION

The Foucha case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana's statute providing for civil commitment subsequent to a criminal defendant's acquittal by reason of
insanity. Louisiana law provided for automatic commitment of
defendants who successfully asserted a defense of insanity.
The constitutionality of automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees had been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in Jones v. United States.2 Louisiana, however, provided
for the release of a person committed under this law only if
the individual could demonstrate that he was no longer dangerous. 3 Thus, a person could be confined indefinitely in a
mental hospital despite the fact that he was no longer mentally
ill.
Terry Foucha was confined in a Louisiana state mental
hospital under this statute. He had been prosecuted for aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm,4 and was
acquitted by reason of insanity. Following several years of confinement in a mental institution, Foucha sought his release in
1988. The superintendent of the facility in which he was confined recommended his discharge, and none of the mental disability professionals involved in the hearing (including the
state's experts) disagreed with the conclusion that he no longer
had a mental illness.' But the trial court concluded that
Foucha had not carried the burden of persuasion that he was
not prospectively dangerous, and his request for release was
2. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity
Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV.
961, 968-83 (1986) [hereinafter Ellis, Consequences].
3. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1992).
4. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
5. Id. at 1139-40.

Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana

1992]

denied. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed on appeal,6
and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari7 "because the case present[ed] an important issue and was
decided by the court below in a manner arguably at odds with
prior decisions of this Court."'
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Justice
White's majority opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, Souter, and, for most issues, Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part (with
regard to procedural and substantive due process) and concurring in the judgment. Justice Kennedy filed a dissent, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice Thomas also
wrote a lengthy dissent that was joined by Justice Scalia and
the Chief Justice.
Justice White's majority opinion held that the Louisiana
statute is unconstitutional on grounds of both substantive and
procedural due process. Writing for a plurality of four Justices, he also concluded that the statute violated equal protection. Although Justice O'Connor thought that the question
raised about equal treatment was "serious," she declined to
join this portion of the opinion because she believed it "unnecessary to reach equal protection issues on the facts before
us ...

"9

As is often true in difficult cases involving a close division
of the Justices, the majority opinion is something less than a
model of clarity. The remaining sections of this Article
attempt to sort out what the Court has said about the constitutional doctrines of procedural and substantive due process and
equal protection.
II.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The procedural challenge to Louisiana's statute involved
the fact that acquittees were required to demonstrate their
own lack of dangerousness to obtain their release. In 1979, the
Supreme Court had held in Addington v. Texas 10 that civil
commitment statutes violated the procedural meaning of the
Due Process Clause unless the state were required to carry the
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
111 S. Ct. 1412 (1991).
Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (1992).
I. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

10. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence." By
contrast, in the 1983 case of Jones v. United States,'2 the Court
permitted some jurisdictions to place the burden of persuasion
on insanity acquittees whose commitment is sought because
the factual findings inherent in their acquittal were deemed
sufficient to indicate prospective dangerousness and mental illness.' 3 The issue in Foucha was whether Louisiana could constitutionally place the burden on acquittees whom it conceded
no longer had any mental illness.
The Court concluded that this case was governed by Addington rather than Jones, and therefore, procedural due process required that Foucha be given a release hearing at which
the state bore the burden by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus the key to the procedural holding in Foucha was the
determination that this case was distinguishable from Jones.
The majority found the source of the distinction in the Jones
opinion itself, which had limited the ability to hold an acquittee under special procedures only "until such time as he has
regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.""4 Because Foucha had "regained his sanity," the state lost
its authority to treat him differently from other individuals
whose confinement was sought.' 5 Without that extraordinary
authority, the procedural due process calculus was the same as
the holding in Addington, in which the individual's interest in
physical liberty outweighed the state's interest in a different
burden of persuasion when considered in light of the risk of
11. Id.
12. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). The holding of Jones could be read to extend only to
jurisdictions that placed the burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity at the
criminal trial on the defendant. See Ellis, Consequences, supra note 2, at 972 n.53;
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,
Standard 7-7.4 cmt. at 425 n.18 (First Tentative Draft 1989) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS]. Louisiana's handling of the issue of insanity at trial does not differ from
the District of Columbia's in Jones, and therefore, the holding of Jones applies to
Louisiana's treatment of acquittees who remain mentally ill.

13. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
14. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 370).
15. The state argued that this passage in the Jones opinion was merely descriptive
of the District of Columbia statute and thus not part of the decision's constitutional
holding. But the Jones Court's citation to a constitutional case, O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1976), as authority for this passage belies such a
reading. Furthermore, the Jones Court's use of the disjunctive in the quoted passage
was certainly not inadvertent. At another point in its opinion, the Court had
emphasized that the release of an insanity acquittee "who recovers] his sanity or is no
longer dangerous" was required precisely because his "confinement rests on his
continuing illness and dangerousness." Jones, 463 U.S. at 368-69 (emphasis added).

1992]
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that the requested procedure would
error and the likelihood
16
risk.
that
reduce
Justice Thomas's dissent addresses the procedural due process holding of the majority by first denying that it exists:
"What the Court styles a 'procedural' due process analysis is in
reality an equal protection analysis."1 7 This hyperbolic statement is an introduction to a complaint that the majority does
not spell out its analysis balancing out the state and individual
interests: "[T]he Court does not even pretend to examine the
fairness of the release procedures the State has provided."'"
Justice Thomas does not discuss that issue in detail either, but
indicates that he is satisfied because Foucha had a forum in
which to seek his release and because he "was represented by
state-appointed counsel."' 9 There is little discussion of the
extent to which a different burden of persuasion might reduce
the risk of erroneous commitment.
At a more basic level, Justice Thomas indicates that he
disagrees with the majority about what he would consider an
"error." Citing previous Supreme Court decisions, he finds
assurance that the criminal trial court's finding that the
defendant committed the underlying act "eliminates the risk
that he is being committed for mere 'idiosyncratic behavior.'"20
While the subject is not discussed directly in Justice White's
opinion, it appears that the majority envisions a broader spectrum of potential "errors" than those described by Justice
Thomas that must be guarded against, including confinement
in a mental hospital of an individual who concededly has no
mental illness and who may not be dangerous to himself or
others.
Justice White's majority opinion does not discuss the elements of the procedural due process balancing test in detail,
and thus the opinion does not advance our understanding of
the Court's approach to the individual elements of that test or
their interrelationship. Nevertheless, the Foucha decision has
major significance in the field of procedural due process
because it signals a return to that balancing process. The Jones
16. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See generally Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
17. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. Id at 1803 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1800-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 367 (1983)).
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Court's acquiescence in shifting the burden of persuasion to
insanity acquittees on the basis of presumptions has been
viewed widely as a departure from established principles of
procedural due process case law. 21 The Foucha case presented
the Court with the choice between extending the Jones
approach to new areas or limiting it to its facts. The majority
chose to adhere to the general rules of procedural due process.
In doing so, the Court appears to have sent a signal that it will
continue to require states to provide individuals sufficient procedural protections to prevent erroneous deprivations of
liberty.
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION

The Louisiana statute was also challenged as violating the
Equal Protection Clause. While there is no majority opinion
on the equal protection issue, the positions on this issue in Justice White's plurality opinion,2 2 Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, and the dissenting opinions shed some light on the
Justices' view of the appropriate implementation of equal protection doctrine.
Justice White began by identifying, as the appropriate
point of comparison, the difference in treatment between
insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill and other
classes of persons who have committed criminal acts but cannot be punished under the law. These classes include individuals who commmitted a crime for which the statute of
limitations expired before they could be tried, persons acquitted because of insufficient evidence where the later discovery
of conclusive evidence of guilt precluded a conviction because
of double jeopardy, and persons who completed their sentence
of imprisonment. People in each of these classes are entitled
to physical liberty unless the state obtains their commitment
in a hearing at which the state is required to carry the burden
21. See generally MICHAEL PERLIN, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 332-38 (1989) (stating that "the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United
States-criticized nearly universally by legal and mental health professional
commentators-should be seen as a political decision, reflecting the Court's reluctance
to contradict what it perceives as public sentiment") and authorities cited therein;
Peter Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad" Proceduresfor
the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 793 (1984); Ellis, Consequences, supra note 2, at 969-80.
22. Justice White's opinion, which speaks for a majority of the Court on both
procedural and substantive due process issues, is a plurality opinion in Part III on
equal protection issues because Justice O'Connor declined to join that section.

Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana
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of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence.2 3 By contrast,
insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill can only
obtain their release if they can demonstrate their own nondangerousness.
To decide whether the state has a sufficient justification
for treating these similarly situated groups differently, the
Court customarily selects a level or tier of review, which is an
indication of the degree of deference the Justices will bring to
their evaluation of the state's choice. Either of two considerations will lead the Court to a heightened degree of skepticism
about a discriminatory state law: the fact that the law discriminates against a suspect (or semi-suspect) classification 24 or the
fact that the discrimination deprives someone of a fundamental
right.2 5 Since the discrimination inherent in the Louisiana
statutory scheme does not involve anything similar to suspect
classifications previously recognized by the Court,26 the only
possibility of heightened scrutiny would depend on the finding
of a fundamental right. Discriminatory deprivation of a fundamental right traditionally requires the government to demonstrate that it has a "compelling state interest" for the
deprivation and that no other means are available for carrying
out its interests that are less restrictive of constitutional
rights.

27

Justice White clearly finds that such a right is involved in
the Louisiana statute. "Freedom from physical restraint being
a fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not put forward, for such discrimination against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally
ill."'28 The opinion particularly calls attention to a comparison

to convicts "who have completed their prison terms, or are
about to do so."' 29 Justice White observes that
[m]any of them will likely suffer from the same sort of personality disorder that Foucha exhibits. However, state law
23. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783.
24. See generally James W. Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications,3
CONST. COMMENTARY 375 (1986).
25. See generally San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-80 (4th ed. 1991).

26. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401

U.S. 371 (1971); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
28. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1788 (White, J., plurality opinion as to Part III).
29. 1& (White, J., plurality opinion as to Part III).
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does not allow for their continuing confinement based
merely on dangerousness. Instead, the State controls the
behavior of these similarly situated citizens by relying on
other means, such as punishment, deterrence, and super30
vised release.
A similar equal protection challenge had been raised and
rejected in Jones. But Justice White's Foucha opinion distinguishes that holding on the basis that, unlike Jones, Foucha is
not currently mentally ill. He also appears to shift the point of
comparison, describing the Jones decision as rejecting a comparison to civil mental patients, whereas Foucha relies upon a
comparison to "other classes of persons who have committed
criminal acts and who cannot later prove they would not be

dangerous. "31
Ordinarily, a plurality opinion on an issue unnecessary for
the resolution of a Supreme Court case would attract relatively
little interest. But Justice O'Connor, who declined to join this
section of the opinion and whose views would constitute the
fifth vote, also alludes to the equal protection issue:
Equal protection principles may set additional limits on the
confinement of sane but dangerous acquittees. Although I
think it unnecessary to reach equal protection issues on the
facts before us, the permissibility of holding an acquittee
who is not mentally ill longer than a person convicted of the
same crimes could be imprisoned is open to serious
32
question.
Thus, she appears to share the belief that there are equal
protection limits on the ability of states to confine insanity
acquittees who are no longer mentally ill, but expresses her
concern specifically (although not necessarily exclusively)
about equal protection problems surrounding dissimilar duration of confinement in contrast to the length of the imprisonment of individuals convicted of the same crime.3 3
Of particular interest is the Foucha opinion's use of the
30. Id. (White, J., plurality opinion as to Part III).
31.
32.
33.
that it

Id. (White, J., plurality opinion as to Part III).
Id, at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor also indicates
might be possible for a state to craft a narrower commitment law for the

confinement

of acquittees

who are no longer

mentally ill, which might pass

constitutional muster. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Speculation on the content of such a hypothetical statute is beyond the scope of this
Article.

1992]
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Court's earlier decision in Baxstrom v. Herold. 4 In Baxstrom,
the Warren Court had struck down, as a violation of equal protection, a statute that permitted the state to continue the confinement of prisoners past the expiration of their sentences
without granting them the rights of the civil commitment system. The passage of a quarter of a century and changes in the
Court's personnel had engendered some doubt about the continued vitality of Baxstrom. The Court's decision in Foucha
puts an end to such speculation. Justice White's majority opinion 35 notes, with apparent approval, that previous decisions of
the Court had relied on Baxstrom.36 The majority also refers,
without further specific citation, to the Baxstrom principle.
The Court observed that Louisiana sought to justify its continued confinement of Foucha on the basis that the criminal trial
court had found that he had committed a criminal act.
This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely
any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be
shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to crimicriminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted
37
nal, even though he has completed his prison term.
Indeed, the dissenting Justices offer no suggestion that
they doubt the continuing vitality of the Baxstrom principle.38
Although the equal protection discussion is not central to the
Supreme Court's decision, its reaffirmation of the principle of
Baxstrom may prove significant in future cases involving deprivation of physical liberty, including provisions for confining
prisoners following the expiration of their criminal sentence.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The most significant portions of the Foucha decision
involve the substantive meaning of the Due Process Clause.
34. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
35. While Justice O'Connor does not join the portion of Justice White's opinion
that directly addresses equal protection, it is noteworthy that approving discussion of
Baxstrom is to be found in portions of the opinion that Justice O'Connor does join.

36. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
37. Id. at 1787 (emphasis added).
38. See id at 1787 n.6 ("The [Thomas] dissent... does not challenge the holding of
our cases that a convicted criminal may not be held as a mentally ill person without
following the requirements for civil commitment, which would not permit further
detention based on dangerousness alone"). Justice Thomas specifically observes that
the state could not keep an individual beyond the expiration of his sentence, citing as a
source of the constitutional limitation Article I, Section 10's prohibition on ex post
facto laws. Id. at 1807 n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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This segment of the opinion is important not only for the limitations on state power that it announces but also for the broadening of state powers that would have accompanied an opposite
holding.
In recent years, the Court has renewed its use of substantive due process as a limitation on state restrictions of individual liberty.3 9 As the majority observed, "The Due Process
Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them.' ",40 In the Foucha
litigation, the claim was that Louisiana lacked the power to
deprive an individual on a claim of dangerousness alone when
it was not accompanied by any mental disability. In upholding
this argument, the Justices addressed a number of substantive
due process issues.
A.

The Structure of Substantive Due Process

In its modern incarnation, substantive due process adjudication resembles the equal protection doctrine developed in
the years since World War II. Infringement of a fundamental
right requires the state to prove the existence of a "compelling
governmental interest" and to demonstrate that no alternative
means are available that involve a lesser deprivation of liberty. 41 By contrast, deprivation of a liberty interest that is not
deemed fundamental will be allowed if it is "rationally
related" to a legitimate governmental purpose. 42 As in modern
equal protection analysis, use of the "compelling state interest"
test signals extreme skepticism about a law's constitutionality,
while the "rational basis" test is extraordinarily deferential to
state choices.
39. There is, of course, a lengthy controversy about the legitimacy and scope of the
substantive meaning of due process. See, e.g, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 362-80 (4th ed. 1991); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 (1990); LAWRENCE L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-86, 1302-12 (2d ed. 1988). The merits of this
controversy are beyond the scope of this Article. For these purposes, it is sufficient to
note that the Court has relied on substantive due process in a considerable number of
cases in recent years, especially cases involving mental disability. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
40. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990)).
41. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

1992]
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The Foucha decision begins its substantive due process
analysis by recognizing the fundamental nature of an individual's liberty interest in freedom from physical confinement.
"Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action."4 3 Having identified that the state was
depriving Foucha of a fundamental right, traditionally the next
step is ascertaining whether the state has a compelling justification for the deprivation."
B.

The Relevance of Salerno

At this juncture, the Justices were required to address the
relevance of their 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno.4 5
That case upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984, which provided for pretrial detention of
certain defendants who were found likely to commit dangerous
crimes while awaiting trial. The Salerno decision also found
freedom from physical confinement to be a fundamental right,
but found the "government's interest in preventing crime by
arrestees [to be] both legitimate and compelling.

'46

Thus,

Salerno suggested the possibility that states could invariably
succeed in immunizing deprivations of physical liberty from
substantive due process challenge by merely reciting as a justification their "compelling" interest in crime prevention. When
certiorari was granted, the Foucha case appeared to present a
plausible vehicle for announcing such an extension of the
Salerno holding.4 7 Such an interpretation would essentially
eliminate any substantive due process limitations on the state's
ability to incarcerate individuals.
With elaborate care, the Foucha majority emphatically
rejects such an expansive reading of Salerno. Justice White's
43. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982)).
44. The majority's conclusion that Foucha has been deprived of a fundamental
right, thus triggering strict scrutiny, is sharply disputed in Justice Thomas's dissenting
opinion. I& at 1804-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). A detailed analysis of Justice
Thomas's alternative framework for substantive due process is beyond the scope of
this brief Article and is reserved for another occasion.

45. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
46. 1d. at 749.
47. It was the specter of such an expansive reading of Salerno, which could be
used to greatly expand the power of the state to incarcerate without the protections of
a criminal trial people deemed "dangerous," that led several of the amicus curiae
organizations to enter the Foucha case.
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opinion begins by detailing the particular substantive and procedural provisions of the Bail Reform Act that limited the government's ability to confine individuals for the protection of
society. The Court notes that the statute "carefully limited the
circumstances under which detention could be sought" by limiting the scope of the law to "the most serious of crimes. "48
Moreover, that law "was narrowly focused on a particularly
acute problem in which the government interests are overwhelming.

'49

The Court then addresses some of the proce-

dural protections in the Act, noting that potential detainees
were entitled to a "full-blown adversary hearing" at which the
government was required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual presented "an identified
and articulable threat to an individual or the community."'
This statement appears to suggest that the presence of these
procedural protections limited the scope of Salerno's substantive due process holding.
Furthermore, in Salerno the government was required to
demonstrate, again by clear and convincing evidence, "that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person. ...

"' This latter reference appears

to require, in the traditional formula of strict scrutiny analysis,
that the state demonstrate that no "less drastic means" are
available for the accomplishment of its "compelling" interests.52 The Foucha opinion further observed that confinement
under the statute in Salerno was strictly limited in duration
because of the "stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial
Act,""3 and pointedly noted that, under the Act if the arrestee
"were acquitted, he would go free. ' "' The majority also noted
that the conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees were
appropriate for the accomplishment of the government's stated
purpose.55
48. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747).
49. Id (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750). This passage, at least in the Foucha
context, appears to address the "narrow focus" of the possibility that serious crimes
might be committed during the limited time before trial. It is difficult to read this
passage as approving a more general exercise of the state's interest in crime
prevention.
50. Id, (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751).
51. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751).

52. Cf.Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
53. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747).

54. Id
55. "Moreover,

the

Act

required

that

detainees

be housed,

to

the

extent
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The Court then explicitly distinguishes Salerno and details
how the Louisiana statute lacks each of these limitations and
protections. "Unlike the sharply focused scheme at issue in
Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully
limited."' The Court notes such differences as the lack of any
durational limitation on confinement and the placement of the
burden of persuasion on the acquittee. Justice White quotes
the state's expert witness at the commitment hearing as saying
only "I don't think I would feel comfortable in certifying that
he would not be a danger to himself or to other people." Justice White observes that "[t]his, under the Louisiana statute,
was enough to defeat Foucha's interest in physical liberty. It is
not enough to defeat Foucha's liberty interest under the Confreed from indefinite confinement in a
stitution in being
57
mental facility.

Because the limitation on the reach of Salerno's substantive due process holding is arguably the most significant aspect
of the Foucha decision, it is worth noting that the dissenting
Justices do not appear to disagree with the conclusion that
Salerno is inapposite. Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
does not rely on Salerno and cites that case only for the proposition that deprivations of liberty prior to trial have been subjected to "heightened due process scrutiny, with regard to both
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion
purpose and duration."'
explicitly states that Louisiana's reliance on Salerno is misplaced because "[t]hat case, as the Court notes, ...

is readily

9

distinguishable."
The principal fear about an extension of Salerno was that
it would permit more novel uses of the state's power to prevent
dangerous acts. The amicus curiae brief for the American
Orthopsychiatric Association and other groups presented the
argument directly:
If that were an accurate reading [of Salerno], every state
would be free to establish general "dangerousness" courts,
and every time the state could persuade the trier of fact that
any citizen would be prospectively dangerous, it could lock
him up indefinitely in "regulatory" confinement until the
practicable, in a facility separate from persons awaiting or serving sentences or
awaiting appeal." Id (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-48).

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1807 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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individual could
prove that he no longer posed a threat to
60
safety.
public
The majority agreed that this was a constitutionally unacceptable prospect. It observed that approval of the Louisiana
scheme "would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present system which,
with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal
law."6 1
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion appears to agree on
this point. "We would not allow a State to evade its burden of
proof by replacing its criminal law with a civil system in which
there is no presumption of innocence and the defendant has
the burden of proof."6 2
Thus, Foucha makes clear that the Supreme Court would
be skeptical of the constitutionality of any attempt to employ
an expansive reading of Salerno to justify novel systems of
civil confinement in the name of public safety and the prevention of future dangerous acts.
C.

Limitationson the Nature and Durationof Confinement

In one of the first substantive due process cases of the
modern era, Jackson v. Indiana,3 the Supreme Court held
that in cases involving civil confinement, "[a]t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the individual is committed."" The Court in Foucha addressed
both the nature and duration of confinement under the Louisiana statutory scheme.
Addressing the nature of his confinement, the majority
places special emphasis on the fact that Foucha, who no longer
had a mental illness, was incarcerated' in a mental hospital.
"[E]ven if his continued confinement were constitutionally per60.
Foucha
61.
62.

Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, et al. at 13,
v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (No. 90-5844).
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787.
Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

63. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
64. Id at 738.
65. As the American Orthopsychiatric Association noted, "[t]he term 'hospitalize'

would certainly be inappropriate in these circumstances, since Petitioner has no
'illness' and the state concedes that it cannot and will not provide him 'treatment.'"
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missible, keeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a determination in civil commitment
proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness."66
As authority for this proposition, Justice White cited the statement in Vitek v. Jones that "[t]he loss of liberty produced by
an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom
from confinement." 7 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,
also citing Vitek, stated: "I think it clear that acquittees could
not be confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection
between the nature and purposes of confinement would be
absent."6 Even Justice Thomas, who objected vigorously to
the conclusion that Foucha's confinement in a mental hospital
violated substantive due process, conceded that there could be
some circumstances in which the nature of the confinement
could have due process dimensions. 9
The Court was similarly concerned about the potentially
indefinite duration of Foucha's confinement. In Jones v.
United States, the Court declined to impose a durational limitation on the commitment of insanity acquittees equivalent to
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, supra note 60, at
18 n.10.
66. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784.
67. Id. at 1785 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980)). The suggestion
that Vitek provided a source of a substantive due process limitation on the use of
mental hospitals to confine persons who had no mental illness came from the amicus
curiae brief of the American Psychiatric Association: "In that circumstance, the use of
a psychiatric hospital worsens the deprivation of liberty suffered by an individual."
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychiatric Association at 10, Foucha v.
Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (No. 90-5844). Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
criticizes this use of Vitek, noting that in Vitek the incremental loss of liberty had
been stigmatization as a person with mental illness, which is not comparable for an
individual who has asserted an affirmative defense of insanity. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at
1797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The amicus curiae brief of the American
Orthopsychiatric Association made a similar point as a policy argument. "The statute
... transforms mental hospitals into prisons and turns mental health professionals into
jailors. Therapists are required to confine individuals whom they cannot treat because
they have no illness." Amicus Curiae Brief of American Orthopsychiatric Association,
supra note 60, at 18-19.
68. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
69. "In particularcircumstances,of course, it may be unconstitutional for a State
to confine in a mental institution a person who is no longer insane. This would be a
different case had Foucha challenged specific conditions of confinement-for instance,
being forced to share a cell with an insane person, or being involuntarily treated after
recovering his sanity." Id. at 1809 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It
may be worth noting that it is not customary to refer to the rooms in psychiatric
hospitals as "cells."
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the length of imprisonment that could have followed conviction because "[t]here simply is no necessary correlation
between severity of the offense and the length of time necessary for recovery."" ° As noted earlier, the Foucha decision distinguished Jones because the state was not entitled to confine
an acquittee awaiting a "recovery" that had already occurred.
And as discussed earlier, the limited duration of the confinement in Salerno was a distinguishing feature that the majority
emphasized.
It is also noteworthy that even the dissenting Justices
expressed some concern about potential confinement of excessive duration. For example, Justice Thomas stated: "I fully
agree with Justice O'Connor... that there would be a serious
question of rationality had Louisiana sought to institutionalize
a sane insanity acquittee for a period longer than he might
have been imprisoned if convicted."'"
The Foucha decision thus gives some indication of the
meaning of the now familiar declaration that the confinement's nature and duration must be sufficiently related to its
purpose, including special concern about unlimited duration in
the absence of mental illness requiring active medical
treatment.
V.

FOUCHA AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE

The Court's decision also gives some indication of the Justices' views about the insanity defense. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which provides the fifth vote for the Court's
majority, emphasizes that the Court's holding places no new
restriction on the states' freedom to determine whether and to
what extent mental illness should excuse criminal behavior.
The Court does not indicate that states must make the insanity
defense available. "If a State concludes that mental illness is
best considered in the context of criminal sentencing, the holding of this case erects no bar to implementing that
judgment." 2
70. 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
71. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1808 n.17 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
appears to share this view, emphasizing that Foucha had not yet been confined for a
period that exceeded the term of imprisonment for individuals who were convicted of
the crime for which he was acquitted. Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor also indicates that the Foucha holding is not dispositive on the
constitutionality of statutes providing the alternative verdict form of "guilty but
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Justice O'Connor's point is, of course, that these issues are
unrelated to the Foucha case. Neither the members of Justice
White's majority/plurality nor any of the dissenters provide
any indication of how they would resolve such constitutional
questions if they should ever reach the Court.
But Foucha does address directly what an acquittal by reason of insanity means. The dissenting Justices express the
view that such an acquittal means only what the state wants it
to mean. Justice Thomas expresses the point bluntly:
Conviction is, of course, a significant event. But I am not
sure that it deserves talismanic significance. Once a State
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual has
committed a crime, it is, at a minimum, not obviously a matter of Federal Constitutional concern whether the State proceeds to label that individual "guilty," "guilty but insane," or
"not guilty by reason of insanity." A State may just as well
decide to label its verdicts "A," "B," and "C." It is surely
rather odd to have rules of Federal Constitutional
law turn
73
entirely upon the label chosen by the State.
Justice Kennedy indicated a similar view: "A verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity is neither equivalent nor comparable to a verdict of not guilty standing alone. '74 Thus, the
dissenters' perspective is that states are free to treat insanity
acquittals as fundamentally dissimilar from all other acquittals
-indeed to treat them as equivalent to convictions-so long as
they do not employ the terminology of "punishment." 5
But the majority of the Justices clearly reject this view.
Justice White's opinion explicitly declines to view the state's
granting of the status of acquittal as a mere matter of semantics and concludes that such a contention was precluded by
Jones.7 Although the Court does not address the controversial
question of whether states are obligated to offer defendants
some form of the insanity defense,77 it thus makes clear that
mentally ill." Id. (citations omitted). See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 494 (1985).
73. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1805-06 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) ("As [an insanity acquittee]
was not convicted, he may not be punished.").
76. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783-84 n.4.
77. See generally Richard G. Singer, Abolition of the Insanity Defense: Madness
and the Criminal Law, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 683 (1983).
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they are not permitted to acquit a defendant and then treat
him as if he had been convicted.
VI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PSYCHIATRIC
UNCERTAINTY

A final topic addressed by the Justices involves the constitutional significance of professional and scientific uncertainty
in the field of psychiatry and other mental disability professions. The Justices' various opinions in Foucha address this
question.
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, quoting previous
cases, recites the Court's now familiar caveats about the imprecision of psychiatry as a field of scientific study:
[W]e have recognized repeatedly the "uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the
present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental
disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment."
The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not
act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative
78
judgments.
Justice Thomas interprets this admonition to require deference to Louisiana's legislative judgment that psychiatric
doubt about an individual's future dangerousness is sufficient
justification for his continued and indefinite confinement.7 9
The majority acknowledges the reality of psychiatric
uncertainty and imprecision, but derives from it the opposite
conclusion. Justice White noted that states (including Louisiana) have found the condition of psychiatric knowledge to be
sufficiently reliable to justify civil commitment, and indeed
insanity acquittals themselves, based upon such testimony.8 0
The amicus brief of the American Orthopsychiatric Association
reached a similar conclusion by somewhat different reasoning.
In previous cases involving mental disability, this Court has
observed that some degree of judicial deference is warranted
when legislatures "act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties. . . ." But no such deference is owed to
78. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at

365 n.13).
79. Id at 1802 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1783 n.3.
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the Louisiana statute because it involves no "medical or scientific uncertainties" because the commitment of a person
who has no mental illness involves no "medical or scientific"
issues. It is either punishment under the guise of civil commitment, or unvarnished preventive detention without the
substantive, procedural, or durational limits that this Court
81
has found to be required under the Due Process Clause.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Foucha declined several opportunities to expand the power of the state to deprive citizens of
their physical liberty without convicting them of criminal
offenses. It declined to give an expansive reading to previous
case law that would have allowed confinement to be based on
predictions of future dangerous conduct alone. It also declined
to permit a diagnosis of "anti-social personality" 2 to substitute
for mental illness as a predicate for civil commitment.83 And it
refused to allow the state to place on an individual who had no
mental illness the burden of somehow proving that he would
not, in the future, be dangerous.
While each of these holdings can be viewed as negative,
their sum is an important affirmation that "[f]reedom from
bodily restraint [is] at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, '
and that "[iln our society liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.""s

81. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, supra note
60, at 20.
82. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
83. See generally Gerald F. Uelman, The Psychiatrist, the Sociopath and the
Courts: New Lines for an Old Battle, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1980); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01(2) (1985).
84. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
85. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

